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AUSTRALIAN RELIGIOUS POETRY 
Kevin Hart 
Australian religious poetry: what does this expression mean? At first 
glance the answer seems perfectly clear and dry. There exists a region 
of poetry, and we wish to limit ourselves to a part that can be called 
religious. Moreover, we are strictly concerned with that portion of 
religious poetry which comes from Australia. It is a simple answer and 
to some extent an inevitable one. Yet once we accept it all sorts of 
difficulties arise. Just how easy is it to delimit a field of poetry, if there 
is such a thing? 
As soon as you propose a definition of poetry, even one that might 
meet with broad approval in the late twentieth century, there will be 
borderline cases that cannot be dismissed. If you frame a definition 
with only canonical verse in mind you may be pained to exclude the 
charms, jingles and riddles that in all likelihood led you to poetry in 
the first place. The same gesture will lead you to omit many if not all 
of the contemporary poems that intrigue and sustain you. Almost 
certainly you will put aside broadsides, folk songs and popular lyrics -
only to find yourself trying to disentangle questions of value from 
questions of definition. The same severity would leave no room for 
clerihews, double dactyls or nonsense verse, and that also would be 
regrettable. If you agree that poetry should not be restricted to verse 
(whether formal or free), then concrete poetry and prose poetry will 
bid for places. Having gone that far, what about 'found poems'? I 
mean snatches from advertisements, catalogues or graffiti that were 
never intended to have literary merit but which suddenly shine with 
poetic effects when read in a suitable context. And if you include prose 
poems someone is sure to point out that there are poetic passages in 
autobiographies, diaries, novels and stories, almost anywhere in fact. 
So far we have been thinking only of English writing. But if you can 
be persuaded that not all poetry gets lost in translation, then poems 
originally composed in other languages will demand your attention, 
giving rise to worries about linguistic and cultural fidelity. Performance 
poetry presents a tricky case, especially when we are living toward the 
end of the print era. To be appreciated outside its contexts of 
performance, oral verse must be presented on tape or audio-visual 
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casette, and then it seems to have its life drained from it. There was 
poetry before the age of print, and there will doubtless be poetry after 
it. I mean poems which cannot be reproduced in two-dimensional 
space, computer poems written in hypertext for instance. 
These few examples show that the borders surrounding poetry are 
broken and shifting, not on one front but on several. Attempts to 
define poetry by excising all dubious or marginal cases impoverish 
what they set out to preserve. But what of the alternative, of not 
worrying much about circumscribing poetry in a Socratic manner and 
letting its various usages go their ways for as long as they can? Faced 
with this possibility people sometimes shudder as if being led to the 
brink of an abyss. There never has been a groundless free-for-all with 
poetry, though. (Or if there has, or even if there has never been 
anything but that, it has never upset people as much as they imagine 
they would be or feel they should be.) The full range of what counts 
as poetry changes over time and place, and conceptual difficulties 
emerge most forcefully when one tries to encompass all those historical 
and cultural differences in the one formulation. The question "Is this a 
poem?" can always be asked, and there are moments when it needs to 
be asked. And yet there are also circumstances when it is not the most 
urgent or even the most useful question to pose. Sometimes recourse 
to definition can be a step backwards, an evasion of poetry and a fear 
of the unknown. In the words of Maurice Blanchot: 'To read a poem is 
not to read yet another poem' .1 
Needless to say, 'religious' is at least as hard to pin down as 
"poetry". The word can be defined this way or that, sociologically or 
theologically, while admitting that in practice these categories overlap 
substantially and cannot always be separated even under the glare of 
theory. From atheists and the pious alike, there is always pressure to 
restrict "religious" to a traditional devotion; after all, in one sense the 
word has long come to mean "strict". Rebelling against this curbing of 
meaning (while acknowledging that religion can be most intense when 
most austere, long before it flares into enthusiasm or fanaticism, 
themselves important religious phenomena), one can readily be enticed 
to take the exact opposite direction. Yet once we begin to extend the 
scope of "religious" it is hard to know when and how to stop. The 
difficulties are bad enough when dealing with one faith, let alone when 
attempting to keep several in play. Certainly we have to accept natural 
and revealed religions and certainly we have to go well past 
institutional borders. Many people for whom churches and temples 
mean little or nothing acknowledge a higher power -personal or 
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impersonal, singular or plural, transcendent or immanent -which they 
take to influence or even guide their lives. Once outside organised 
religion can we also pass beyond the observance of rites? Not if by 
"outside" we have in mind only those individuals of a mystical or 
occultist tendency. But "rites" can mean more than ceremonies and 
sacraments; the concept also includes the customs and habits associated 
with belief. That gives "rites" a very wide extension, too wide some are 
bound to say. Yet there will always be an Immanuel Kant to insist that 
religion is essentially a matter of morality and that works of Grace, 
miracles, mysteries, and means of Grace are mere supplements to be 
kept outside religion's true and proper limits. And there will always be 
people who will side with him. 
What of men and women who do not worship a higher power but 
who remain devoted to a religious teaching? Consider the Taoists, 
followers of Lao-tzu whose doctrines are gathered in the Tao-te-ching. 
When Taoists talk of the Tao or Way, they do not have a supreme 
being in mind, perhaps not even Being as usually understood in the 
west. Certainly it is nothing that could be regarded as God or a god. 
Even at their most speculative, when claiming that Tao is inaudible, 
invisible, unchangeable and unnameable, they are using negations to 
indicate a transcendental principle, not a transcendent deity. Like the 
lines dividing religion from mythology, the borders between religion 
and philosophy tend to be wavy and interrupted. In both situations the 
limits are apparent not only at the edges, giving rise to fiddly cases; 
they are often to be found at the doctrinal centre of a religion. Every 
time a Catholic recites the Nicene Creed at Mass he or she assents, at 
least tacitly, to certain notions of Aristotelian metaphysics. (By the 
same token philosophy can be deeply marked by myth -Plato's fable 
of the cave and Nietzsche's invocation of the eternal return, for 
example -or, equally, philosophy can be touched by an intense 
religious longing: Plotinus's Enneads and Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit are prime examples.) That said, in the western world Taoism 
along with Confucianism is usually treated far more fully in 
encyclopedias of religion than of philosophy. 
Not so with Marxism; and yet in both east and west it has given 
rise to the most widespread and powerful eschatological movement of 
the century. When people talked in the 1950s and 1960s of "the 
Communist Church" in the former Soviet Union, the expression may 
have been intended polemically, linking the bureaucratic machinations 
of Moscow and the Vatican, but it brought and still brings to the fore 
some ways in which communism reset and reworked Christian notions 
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of community and along with them the theological virtues of faith, 
hope and charity. In the first decades of this century Marxism 
promised egalitarianism, and the glow of this promise long outlived the 
economic and political performances of successive governments. In 
recent decades it became increasingly apparent even to deeply 
committed socialists that faith, hope and charity cannot be realised 
within the horizon of dialectical materialism. For all that, there can be 
no simple story of communism versus religion, not least of all because 
Christians, Jews and Muslims (I speak broadly and only of the west) 
have suffered as harshly in our time under anti-communist regimes. 
Besides, both ideological extremes arc perpetually traversed by 
religious motifs, while most religious groups have keen interests in 
both the political at large as well as in party politics. And there is 
another, more harrowing reason not to single out socialism. From the 
1917 Revolution to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and beyond, 
numerous men, women and children of all faiths have fallen victim to 
people of other faiths or of the same belief -and all in the name of 
God. Inhumanity is not restricted to the secular. 
Having come this far, should we include atheism as a religious 
phenomenon? We have no choice but to do so, providing we 
distinguish atheisms that take religious questions seriously from those 
that do not. The view that God does not exist, that all deities are 
illusions, even pernicious ones, is often prosecuted with a fervour that 
derives its energy and sometimes its style from the faith it refuses. 
There are fundamentalists and evangelicals in atheism as surely as 
there are in theism. One of the most rhetorically effective atheists of 
our era is Friedrich Nietzsche. When announcing his terrible message 
'God is dead', he assumed the character of a madman who "ran to the 
market place, and cried incessantly: 'I seek God! I seek God!'" before 
delivering his desolating sermon: 
'Whither is God?' he cried; 'I will tell you. We have killed him 
-you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do 
this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge 
to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when 
we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving 
now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we 
not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all 
directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying 
as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of 
empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night 
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continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns 
in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the 
gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as 
yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God 
is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him? 
Nietzsche would concede that there are many for whom God remains 
an abiding presence (although he would also maintain that, like the 
philosophers, they mistakenly infer the nature of reality from 
contingent grammatical categories). His central point is that believers 
and non-believers alike have not yet admitted to themselves that the 
world is no longer turned decisively toward God, that the realm of the 
transcendent has lost its hold on how we live and how we die. 
If the divine can fade from the world it can always return, possibly 
under a very different form. As modern thinkers and writers have 
discovered time and again, it is easier to dismiss the word and concept 
"God" than to eliminate the category of the sacred. Without slighting 
the illuminations of teachers of all faiths, I have to say that it happens 
-and certainly with great force in our own era -that some of the 
most religiously acute observations are made by those who cannot in 
all conscience avow God. Doubt is not always directly opposed to 
faith; it can be a twisting path to a faith; and everyone who grows in 
belief must risk asking "What does "God" mean?", "How can I speak of 
God?" and "Where is God?" -and not just in moments of abjection 
and suspicion but also in times of contentment and elation. Amongst 
the century's most intense religious writing I would include passages 
from Samuel Beckett's Wailing for Godot, Martin Heidegger's 
Meditations on Holderlin, Franz Kafka's The Castle and Simone Weil's 
Notebooks. These texts do not converge at any one point but taken 
together they urge us not to use the word "God" lightly. They teach 
that to pronounce the divine name too quickly, or to circumscribe it 
too tightly, can crush a question rather than answer it. And they 
suggest that God can be revealed more truly in the question than in 
the answer. Thinking along these lines, who can brood on Edmond 
Jabes's The Book of Questions without gaining a deeper understanding 
of the anguished attempts to fathom God after the Holocaust? If 
nothing else, you will be haunted by one or more of the fragments 
uttered by his imaginary rabbis: 'God is a questioning of God' one of 
them hazards, and then -almost as a long deferred reply -another 
ventures, 'God is always in search of God'.3 Strange words, though not 
to a Kabbalist or a Rhineland mystic. In an interview Jabes says, 
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"What I mean by God in my work is something we come up against, 
an abyss, a void, something against which we are powerless. It is a 
distance ... the distance that is always between things ... We get to 
where we are going, and then there is still this distance to cover. And 
a moment comes when you can no longer cover the distance; you get 
there and you say to yourself, it's finished, there are no more words. 
God is perhaps a word without words".4 
Let us pause for a moment and take stock. When the words 
"poetry" and "religion" are allowed to overlap, like two fuzzy Venn 
diagrams, there forms a rich and unruly set that includes everything 
and anything from carols, hymns and prayers to miracle plays and 
verse essays in doctrine, to stanzas that affirm what Friedrich 
Schleiermacher called a "feeling of absolute dependence" or what 
Romain Rolland dubbed an "oceanic feeling", to assertions of God's 
death and quieter confessions of a gradual fading of belief, and a great 
deal else besides. There is no shortage of ways to tidy up this sprawl. 
Some are drastic. Take Christianity for instance. You can say with Karl 
Barth that Christianity is not a religion because religion is a human 
attempt to find God while Christianity is the story of God going in 
search of sinful men and women. That definition eliminates the 
category of Christian religious verse altogether, though not religious 
verse as such. But to see that being done we have only to turn to 
Samuel Johnson's authoritative comments in his Life of Waller (1781): 
Contemplative piety, or the intercourse between God and the 
human soul, cannot be poetical. Man admitted to implore the 
mercy of his Creator and plead the merits of his Redeemer, is 
already in a higher state than poetry can confer. 
The essence of poetry is invention; such invention as, by 
producing something unexpected, surprises and delights. The 
topics of devotion are few, and being few are universally 
known; but, few as they are, they can be made no more; they 
can receive no grace from novelty of sentiment, and very little 
from novelty of expression.5 
Adopting an opposite stance, you can claim, as very different writers 
have done over the years, that poetry is Orphic: a transfiguration of 
nature into song that overcomes death and the grave. And so, 
regardless of its explicit themes, all poetry is at heart sacred. This 
certainly expands the category of religious poetry, so much so, though, 
that in effect it abolishes it no less surely than Johnson does. 
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Accepting none of these extreme solutions, I would like to keep all 
I can in this mixed and ragged cluster of texts called "religious poetry" 
and overlay one more set, "Australian". It will not solve any difficulties 
but will add some more, in both the fields of poetry and religion. 
When we put "Australian" before either "poetry" or "religion" it seems 
as if we have grafted something very new onto something very old. We 
think of a country that celebrated its bicentennial as recently as 1988, 
two centuries after being declared terra nullius and claimed for the 
Crown by Captain James Cook. As likely as not, we think of 
Australian poetry working with, alongside or sometimes against a long 
tradition of European poetics, and we think of Australian religion as an 
inflection of European Christianity. This accounts for much of our 
poetry and our institutional religiosity, though certainly not for the 
traditional songs and sacred ceremonies of the land's Aboriginal 
peoples. It must be remembered that the word "Australian" derives 
from a seventeeth-century coinage, terra australis, that names an 
uncharted space - Australasia, Polynesia and "Magellanica" - as viewed 
from a European perspective. So to call traditional Aboriginal chants 
Australian is not without problems, for it involves the colonising gaze 
whose effects have brutalised and endangered those same traditions. 
And in a similar way, one should pause a while before construing the 
chants as poetry lest they be measured purely and simply against 
aesthetic norms that remain largely exterior to them. The song cycles 
are living performances, allowing great variation of movement, music 
and words. They cannot be abstracted from their living contexts 
without enormous losses. 
One way to approach Australian poetry and religion is by asking 
what languages they use. English is culturally predominant. But this 
should not blind us to the fact that the land has a hundred and fifty or 
so Aboriginal tongues (and once had many more), and over a hundred 
others drawn from Asia and Europe. To judge from local anthologies 
over the last few decades, "Australian poetry" has come to mean a 
canon of writing composed in English by anglophones living in or born 
in Australia. In recent years especially that canon has been 
supplemented by translations from Aboriginal song cycles. We know 
that verse is composed here in German, Greek and Italian -and very 
occasionally translations from these works appear in anthologies -but 
at the moment it is impossible to form any impression of poetry being 
written locally in Arabic, Chinese, Hungarian, Polish, Spanish, Turkish, 
Ukranian, Vietnamese, or any of the other community languages. 
Even if we were to restrict ourselves to material written in English, 
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Australian poetry would not be all of a piece. Taken by themselves, 
historical markers arc unreliable. 1788 may signal the start of British 
colonialisation, but it can hardly indicate the origin of the country's 
poetry. On the one hand there are writers whose ethnic background 
sets them at variance with the myth of national origin. The verse of 
Antigone Kefala and Dimitris Tsaloumas, for example, moves to the 
rhythms of quite other historical and mythological times. While on the 
other hand there are poets from British stock whose main influences 
are Asian, American or European. Robert Gray's imaginative world, 
for instance, has been shaped by his reading of Francis Ponge, Charles 
Reznikoff, and Japanese Zen poets. In much the same way, when 
taken by themselves geographical markers are not to be trusted. Peter 
Porter is thought by some to be our finest living poet. He was born in 
Brisbane, and returns to Australia from time to time; but for the last 
forty years he has lived in London and made a solid reputation there. 
Where does the Australia in "Australian poetry" begin and end? 
The brief list of community languages spoken in Australia is enough 
to suggest that Christianity, though culturally predominant, is far from 
being the only faith practised in the country. It also indicates that 
Australian Christianity is not monolithic. Catholic traditions from east 
and west are represented, as are the various families of Protestantism 
and other, less easily categorised groups like Baha'i, Christian Science, 
the Society of Friends, and Unitarians. There are many Aboriginal 
religions -not, as is commonly supposed, just the one. Of the major 
world faiths, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism are all to be 
found, though all in relatively small numbers when set against the 
p pulation as a whole· and there are tiny numbers of other sects like 
Rosicrucians, Swedenborgians and Zoroa trian .6 The impact of these 
groups on Australian poetry is very uneven. Although Islam is our 
second largest religious community - a consequence of steady 
immigration from Lebanon and Turkey over the last thirty years -{)De 
would be hard-pressed to find much Muslim poetry written in or 
translated into English. The handful of Australian poets who have 
fallen under the spell of Rumi or Ghalib have done so without the 
mediation of Islam. Conversely, while statistics tell us that there are 
few Australians who follow Chinese religions, several local poets with 
British forebears have been strongly drawn to Buddhism, Taoism, or a 
synthesis of the two, and not only use themes from those faiths but can 
be counted as adherents. 
Potentially, then, the field of Australian religious poetry is vast and 
chaotic. When I was editing The Oxford Book of Australian Religious 
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Poetry in 1992-93 it was often useful, if sometimes daunting, to keep in 
mind a sense of that possible imbroglio and of those needling fringe 
cases. It made me spend weeks and months studying small-press and 
fugitive publications, sifting through fragile collections of nineteenth-
century verse, tracking down books and pamphlets by people born in 
Australia but now living overseas, writing to representatives of 
religious groups who might know of newsletters that printed poems, as 
well as re-reading familiar poems to see if they showed a radiance I 
had not noticed before. The idea of a discrete body of work abiding 
ideally in the space marked out by three overlapping sets was 
beguiling, and doubtless forced me to look in places I might otherwise 
have passed by. But after a while I found myself compelled to change 
my guiding metaphor. I started to think of "Australia", "religion" and 
"poetry" as different threads that had been interlaced, and I was 
encouraged when I recalled one of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks in 
the Philosophical Investigations when explaining the notion of "family 
resemblance". He wrote of how when "spinning a thread we twist fibre 
on fibre", and observed that "the strength of the thread does not reside 
in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the 
overlapping of many fibres".7 
"Poetry", "religion" and "Australia" are threads made from the 
overlapping of various fibres, not one of which runs through a whole 
length. Reading and re-reading for the anthology I found there to be 
no single knot that ties together all three to make "Australian religious 
poetry". There are several knots and they do not always tie up the 
same fibres. Let me give some examples. What makes David Curzon's 
"Proverbs 6: 6" an Australian religious poem is very different from 
what allows us to describe Nigel Roberts' "Reward/for a missing deity" 
and the Yirrkalla people of Arnhem Land's "The Djanggawul Song 
Cycle" in the same three words. David Curzon was born in Melbourne 
but has lived in New York for most of his life. His poem is a midrash 
on a biblical text. Taken from the Hebrew verb drash, meaning 
"search", midrash is a rigorous yet imaginative inquiry into the 
substance of scripture with a view to link it to present concerns and 
questions. In writing this way Curzon joins himself to a tradition of 
commentary that can be traced back centuries before the common era. 
Nigel Roberts was born in New Zealand but has lived most of his 
adult life in Australia. By and large, his writing answers to American 
rather than Australian verse. "Reward/for a missing deity" gains its 
force by twinning the genre of the advertisement for a missing person 
with a sense of God's absence. And the Yirrkalla people's song cycle 
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is, as I suggested earlier, not a poem in a traditional western sense; it is 
abstracted from its ceremonial contexts, translated from an Aboriginal 
tongue and in any case is older than the word "Australia". 
So far I have been trying to uncover some of the complexities in the 
simple expression "Australian religious poetry". Now I would like to 
step back a little and talk more generally about some assumptions that 
I have been making along the way. On the face of it, this step might 
look like passing from remarks based on my experience editing The 
Oxford Book of Australian Religious Poetry to talk about philosophy 
and theology. I don't think there will be such a passage because one of 
my main assumptions is that the distinction between practice and 
theory is differential and not oppositional. There is no neutral zone 
between theory and practice, no dividing line which is neither touched 
by theory nor affected by practice. That line turns out, when you look 
closely, to be divided: what counts as "theory" presumes a set of past 
or future practices that are not always disclosed, while what serves as 
"practice" embodies a range of theoretical moves, including a tacit 
theory of practice, that are not brought to the surface. In literary 
history the closest thing we have to a moment of pure practice is 
automatic writing, although that was always underwritten by theories 
that, once formulated in manifestoes, became known as dada and 
surrealism. And is there a "pure theory"? It is a strange thing that what 
gets called "theory" today usually takes as one of its main targets any 
attempt to totalise experience and knowledge. Not known for agreeing 
on very much, contemporary theorists tend to concur that experience 
and knowledge are clusters of practices that do not form an organic or 
dialectical whole. Their disagreements turn on the right base metaphor 
for those practices: "communication", "gender", "the other", "the 
political", "writing", "the unconscious", and so on. 
I do not propose to discuss either this broad convergence or these 
many divergences in modern critical theory. Nor do I intend to talk at 
any length about how the theory-practice distinction functioned when 
editing my anthology. To be sure, the task of gathering together some 
Australian religious poetry fell to me after I had written on certain 
themes and authors in philosophy, poetry and theology, and after I had 
written four collections of poetry. That earlier work must have affected 
my selections - more positively than negatively, I hope - and I imagine 
too that the experience of editing the anthology has subtly changed 
how I think and write. But my interest is with general assumptions 
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rather than personal consequences, and so I would like to discuss two 
points, implicit in Part I, that bear on thinking about literature and 
theology in the Christian world. 
1. Early on, I made two claims in the one sentence: that poetry 
changes over time and place, and that difficulties emerge when those 
historical and cultural difficulties are occluded. When traced to its 
beginnings, this is the question of definition which, since Socrates, has 
been tightly linked to the question of intelligibility. For those who 
follow Socrates (and at a fundamental level that is everyone in the 
west), what is definable, and hence intelligible, is what in principle can 
be rendered present. This is not a present moment to be replaced by 
another present moment. (For Socrates, Plato and beyond that would 
be an image of the unintelligible.) Rather, a definition is a pure and 
sharp light that isolates something and makes it appear frozen in time. 
The intelligible can be abstracted from time and place; it can be 
repeated without change. This notion of intelligibility has proven to be 
far more durable than either Socratic definition or the doctrine of the 
Forms. It is the bedrock of modern science and technology. No one 
has seen the consequences of this more clearly than Martin Heidegger 
who, in several brilliant papers of the 1950s, argues that modern 
science (in the sense of Wissenshaft) has given up thinking in order to 
calculate. Part of what he means is that, in taking mathematics as 
guide, science posits an object sphere which has the character of 
exactitude, and therefore the only representations that are significant 
are those which can be rendered in symbolically precise ways. Science 
has become research into nature, with the traits of a projected plan, a 
methodology and an on-going activity -the inevitable result of which 
is that nature is understood only when objectified.8 Science may 
question itself and set itself new goals but it never changes its 
metaphysical agenda, its totalising programme of regarding the Other 
by way of the Same. 
If the Greek notion of intelligibility is the bedrock of science and 
technology it is also a touchstone of all other discourse. People like to 
see poetry, for example, as a speaking and writing that keeps itself 
open to alterity and that tries not to domesticate what it encounters as 
strange or uncanny. We re-read certain poems and even memorise 
them because of a mystery that beckons and abides. And yet even the 
most adventurous poetry, that which in striving to tell the truth 
exposes itself to loss of face or meaning, eventually yields to 
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commentary and so becomes an episode in a literary history. 
Emmanuel L6vinas has discussed this as an instance of a general 
distinction between the saying and the said. In the act of saying I am 
sincere, vulnerable, exposed to the other person; it is a moment 
without theme which occurs within the trace of the infinite and which 
answers to a different kind of intelligibility. Here the question of 
definition is recast as the question of the other. This second 
intelligibility is the ethical, understood as an obligation toward the 
other person that touches me before he or she is present d to 
consciousness as him or her. This ethical saying, however, slides 
inevitably into another order of discourse the . which i the rea lm 
of the ontological where presence reigns and where a t talising 
commentary is possible. But even here the ethical docs not cease to 
call , for authentic poetry has an uncanny ability to unsay itself, to show 
its marks of the infinite, to keep itself from falling completely into a 
static totality. 
That memorable lyric poems suggest they have been occasions of a 
pure saying, times that have been partly lost and perhap. were never 
present, rings true. In modern poetry I find this effect in lyrics by 
(amongst others) Rene d tar and Eugenio Montale, WaUace Steven 
and Francis Webh. Bul the hint of a pure saying always suppresses an 
impure action; and is it not Lrue to say a. Harold Bloom does, that 
capable poems begin wi th an ironic. werve from lbe poems that matte r 
mo l to them? ln the world of authors the ther may command in and 
through a poem from a grea t heigh L, but the re. ponse will not be one 
of passivity. Where Bloom and Levinas would agree though is that 
poetry is not written under the sign of presence. For the one presence 
is a religion illusion, [or the other it is an impediment to authenlic 
faith, while for both it is a 'hristian my tiiica tion with a complex root 
system in Greek philosophy. 
2. Thi bring me to my econd assumption, that the word "God" more 
properly belongs at the end of a discourse or meditation (perhaps even 
a life) than at its beginning. There are few words more 
overdetermined than "God"· it satisfies desires from aU spheres of 
human activity, botb consciou and unconsciou . There can be no 
que tion of isolating a pore and original ense of lhe word "God", f 
recalling il to certain strict limits and insisting that it be used in its lrue 
ense, whether we call that biblica l religious, theological, r omclhing 
else again. Whenever it is said or written, the word "GocJI' is never 
pure or simple· it divides and llees, like dropped mercury. And 
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because "God" has so many feelings and concepts invested in it, it is 
never possible to tell exactly what the word will communicate, even 
amongst Christians. Can one ever disentangle, even within oneself, 
God as an introjected father image, God as the ground of being, and 
God as the creator of all that is? Can one draw a steady line between 
myth and truth in the New Testament? Can one even resolve the 
ambivalence that comes with regarding God as father? 
Not fully, and doubtless not all to the same extent. And yet the 
word "God" imposes a minimal responsibility on those who use it, a 
charge to say it or write it always in contradistinction to "god." We 
may have only an imperfect idea of what the word "God" means, but 
we know that it does not designate an idol. It is not easy to speak of 
God without making Him into an idol: as even that remark shows, 
anthropomorphisms are very difficult to avoid. Using a more abstract 
and austere vocabulary, like that of metaphysics, does not in itself 
mean that one is separating God from idols. Metaphysics has its own 
version of God, the causa sui, which fulfills the philosophical desire for 
an ultimate ground, whether epistemological or ontological.9 To 
disengage God from the causa sui is the critical task of a non-
metaphysical theology, an operation that leads to a negative theology. 
In such a theology 'presence' must be distinguished from 'being', as 
must 'transcendence'. But a non-metaphysical theology has an 
affirmative as well as a negative task, and that is to rethink presence 
and transcendence in terms of divine love rather than in the categories 
of being and knowing. 
How can this be done? In many ways, surely, but in concluding I 
will suggest one: a theological ethics. At first glance this seems to be at 
the antipodes of mysticism which always hints at immediate and 
unsayable experience of divine love. For a theological ethics would 
teach that the divine can be approached only in and through our 
relations with other people. But perhaps this is an illusion, and at a 
certain stage the mystical crosses the path of ethics. Could it be that 
the presence of God occurs as traces of the infinite rather than as an 
afflatus of being? And could it be that transcendence has an ethical 
and not an ontological structure? In posing these questions I am of 
course alluding to the recent work of Emmanuel U:vinas, but I am 
also thinking of the gospels. In their very different ways both impress 
on us that the Kingdom is revealed in signs and stories. So a 
theological ethics would be hermeneutical through and through. It 
would be based in scripture though not restricted to it, for who is to 
say that the divine does not leave traces outside the Book? And for 
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that matter, who is to say that other texts -religious poems, for 
instance-are not already interpretations of those traces? 
Kevin Hart is Associate Professor of English and Comparative 
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